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Abstract 
Recent research on international productivity comparisons with historical data has en-
countered large discrepancies between benchmark comparisons and time series extrapola-
tions from other benchmarks. Broadberry and Burhop (2005) have recently argued that 
for Hoffmann’s (1965) widely accepted time series for German industrial output, there is 
no such productivity paradox, while for a revision of that series recently suggested by 
Ritschl (2004), the discrepancy between the Anglo-German benchmark and the time se-
ries projection is considerable. Attempting to reconcile the time series evidence and the 
productivity benchmarks, they discard the revised series in favor of the original, disre-
garding mounting evidence on its lacking reliability. The present paper restates this pro-
ductivity paradox and proposes a possible resolution. We draw on recent archival discov-
eries by Fremdling and Staeglin (2003) and Fremdling (2005) that confirm the revisions 
to the Hoffmann series. We also draw on recent advances in the reconstruction of a Ger-
man industry census of 1936, and argue that the productivity paradox is largely the con-
sequence of mismeasurement in all versions of the German series. Correcting for the 
omissions, much of the Anglo-German productivity paradox disappears. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research has highlighted the difficulties in reconciling historical benchmark com-
parisons of industrial productivity across countries with backward extrapolations from 
more recent benchmarks. Ward and Devereux (2003) have found large discrepancies be-
tween an Anglo-American productivity benchmark they presented for the late 19th cen-
tury and backward extrapolations by Broadberry (1997)2. Similar productivity paradoxes 
might also exist for other cross-country comparisons. While Broadberry (1997) has ar-
gued that in the Anglo-German case, time series evidence and benchmark comparisons 
for the early 20th century fit each other well, a recent revision of the German industrial 
production index by Ritschl (2004) would again seem to suggest a Ward/Devereux-style 
productivity paradox. Broadberry and Burhop (2005) argue that this revision leads to an 
implausibly high German productivity lead on the eve of World War I, while their pre-
ferred version of the German time series data would not. This leads them to discard the 
revised German time series data, disregarding mounting evidence on its biases and lack-
ing reliability.  
 In contrast to this time series evidence, there is little controversy surrounding 
comparative productivity benchmarks for Britain and Germany in the early 20th century. 
Anglo-German benchmark comparisons of productivity by Fremdling (1991) for 1907 
and by Broadberry and Fremdling (1990) for 1935/36 found that German manufacturing 
was roughly at par with Britain before World War I and was slightly ahead of Britain be-
fore World War II. This is conventional wisdom, which confirms earlier work by Rostas 
                                                 
2 For counter-criticism and the subsequent debate, see the comment of Broadberry (2003) and the 
reply by Ward and Devereux (2004).  
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(1943), Rostas (1948), and Paige and Bombach (1959), and which has hardly ever been 
challenged. 
There is now a second vintage (or third, counting the seminal contribution of Ro-
stas (1948)) of studies emerging that recalculate the old results with refined methodolo-
gies and on a much broader database. Broadberry and Burhop (2005) redo Fremdling’s 
(1991) productivity benchmark comparison for 1907 and arrive at broadly the same re-
sults. de Jong and Fremdling (2006) recalculate the 1935 productivity benchmark of 
Broadberry and Fremdling (1990) for 1935/36. In spite of a much improved methodol-
ogy, which includes double deflation, i.e. separate deflators for gross output and interme-
diate inputs, they again arrive at broadly the same results (although in both cases, there 
are important sectoral differences with the earlier estimates). One might wonder why 
these results matter. After all, the broad picture has not changed. So at least it seems. 
The problem is with the time series for Germany. All time series extrapolations of 
comparative Anglo-German productivity employ the index of industrial production of 
Hoffmann (1965), whose series of aggregate and industrial output form the basis of the 
entries for Germany in the work of Maddison (1991), Maddison (1995), Maddison 
(2001). While widely used internationally, Hoffmann’s series have never been fully ac-
cepted in Germany. An older series of Wagenführ (1933) continues to be used for indus-
trial production, while an official income-based national account series is still often em-
ployed for research on the 19th and early 20th century3. A number of authors, notably 
Fremdling (1988), Fremdling (1995) and Holtfrerich (1983), pointed to a number of pit-
                                                 
3 A backward projection of this series into the 19th century was published in Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932).  
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falls in the Hoffmann estimates and suggested avenues for further revision. In this Jour-
nal, Burhop and Wolff (2005) undertook many of these revisions for the 19th century and 
arrived at remarkable deviations from the various aggregate series suggested by Hoff-
mann. For the 20th century, Ritschl and Spoerer (1997) presented an alternative estimate 
of national income beginning in 19014. Recently, Burhop (2005) revised Hoffmann’s in-
dex of industrial production for the 19th century. For 1913 and the interwar years, Ritschl 
(2004) presented a revision which corrects for a biased estimate of metal-processing and 
engineering in Hoffmann’s index of industrial production. He employed this result to 
reconcile Hoffmann’s aggregate output series with the national income estimates of 
Ritschl and Spoerer (1907) for 1913 to 1938. Inserting the revised industrial index into 
Hoffmann’s aggregate output series, almost no systematic differences with the official 
income series remained. 
As a result of these revisions, times series projections of Anglo-German produc-
tivity comparisons do not work well anymore. Broadberry and Burhop (2005) find that 
for the index revision of Ritschl (2004), Germany prior to World War I had an industrial 
productivity lead over Britain of 40-70%, which looks rather implausible given the 
benchmark estimates. Even with the more modest index revisions suggested by Burhop 
(2005), an wider German productivity lead emerges, this time – surprisingly – for the 
1890s. 
Given this disturbing and arguably confusing evidence, the present paper takes a 
fresh look at Germany’s industrial production index and its implications for time series 
                                                 
4 A first, still influential revision of this series is Hoffmann and Müller (1959). On a criticism of 
this revision for the interwar period and a further correction see the appendix in Ritschl 
(2002). 
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projections of Anglo-German productivity comparisons. It examines the scope for revi-
sions and chooses the most compelling ones, while discarding others. It restates the An-
glo-German productivity paradox and suggests a way out. For the index-theoretic reasons 
stated by Ward and Devereux (2003), it would seem to be a sheer miracle – and rather 
accidental – if the productivity paradox could be explained away entirely. However, the 
present paper finds that (a) the revised German series represents output growth better 
than Hoffmann (1965) series employed by  Broadberry and Burhop (2005), (b) additional 
revisions suggest themselves from a recent upward revision of 1935/36 output levels,  (c) 
the productivity paradox is much smaller than calculated by Broadberry and Burhop 
(2005).  
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the German indus-
trial production indices along with the corrections suggested by Burhop (2005) and 
Ritschl (2004), extrapolates Anglo-German productivity backwards from the 1935 
benchmark, and restates the productivity paradox. While the resulting discrepancy is re-
markably lower than in Broadberry and Burhop (2005), it is still considerable and cer-
tainly inconsistent with the 1907 benchmarks.  
Section 3 discusses the underlying index revisions in more detail. Based on new 
archival evidence, the revisions to the Hoffmann index by ritschl (2004) can be further 
substantiated. At first sight, this would imply that the Anglo/German productivity para-
dox is worse than previously thought: just returning to the original Hoffmann series and 
ignoring its bias, as in Broadberry and Burhop (2005), is no longer an option. 
Section 4 examines recent evidence that helps explain the productivity puzzle. 
None of the extant indices reflects the emergence of a large military aircraft industry in 
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Germany beginning in 1934. Including output and employment of that industry in the to-
tal affects the index and, to lesser extent, the 1935 benchmark. As a result, a large portion 
(but not all) of the Anglo/German productivity paradox disappears. 
Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of this paper and presents avenues for fur-
ther research.  
 
2. The Anglo-German productivity paradox restated 
This section reviews the classical industrial production indices by Wagenführ 
(1933) and Hoffmann (1965), along with the corrections to the Hoffmann index sug-
gested by Burhop (2005) for the 19th century and by Ritschl (2004) for the 20th century. 
For three of these indices, it projects Anglo-German productivity backwards from the 
1935 benchmark, and restates the productivity paradox5. 
The first step is to calculate these indices for comparable industries and calculate 
the results into employment.6 In a second step, results are compared to the British series, 
and an index of comparative productivity based on the 1935 benchmark is calculated 
(Table 1). 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
                                                 
5 Burhop’s (2005) corrections, although significant for the 19th century, make little difference for 
the immediate pre-World War I period that we focus on here. 
6 This leaves out utilities and construction. In this way, the indices are comparable to the British 
industrial production series of Feinstein (1972).  
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All backward projections from the 1935 benchmark in Table 1 suggest a German produc-
tivity lead over Britain on the eve of World War I, which is not borne out by the 1907 
benchmark comparisons of Fremdling (1991) and Broadberry and Burhop (2005). The 
discrepancy still looks acceptable for Hoffmann’s (1965) original series7. For the revised 
series, as well as the Wagenführ (1933) estimate, the discrepancy is considerable  – al-
though nowhere near the 70% productivity lead suggested by Broadberry and Burhop 
(2005). The 1907 discrepancy between the backward time series projections and the 
benchmark comparisons is the Anglo-German productivity paradox. 
 
3. Revisions to Hoffmann’s index  
One seemingly obvious strategy is to pick the one series that produces the best fit 
in Table 1, and to discard the rest. This would leave the researcher with the choice of 
Hoffmann’s (1965) original index for Germany, and to possibly accept the revisions of 
Burhop (2005), which generate a German productivity lead as early as the 1890s but not 
around the 1907 benchmark. This is the option chosen by Broadberry and Burhop (2005). 
The price to be paid for this is the choice of a time series that is known to exhibit spuri-
ous growth between the 1907 and 1935 benchmarks. Ritschl (2004) examined output in 
German capital-goods industries across World War I, employing data from the respective 
industry associations along with a detailed commodity-flow estimate of equipment in-
vestment in the German economy by Gehrig (1961). In addition to being consistent with 
the official statistics of gross investment, the resulting series were also consistent with the 
                                                 
7 Broadberry (1993) suggests a 10 per cent error margin between a given benchmark and time 
series projections from a different benchmark. The Hoffmann index would meet this criterion, 
while the others would not. 
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data on domestic steel consumption, machinery exports, as well as with Wagenführ’s 
(1933) index of industrial production and the official national income accounts examined 
in Ritschl (2002). However, they differ strongly from Hoffmann’s (1965) estimate for the 
same industry. As the data in Table 2 bear out, the Hoffmann series of output in metal-
processing industry exhibits far higher growth than the revised series.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The revisions underlying Table 2 are partly based on sales data from Germany’s 
machine building industry association, VDMA, and on Wagenführ’s (1933) machinery 
index8. VDMA published a sales figure for 1913 and a series from 1925 to 1928. In 1928, 
an official industry census for machine building produced slightly lower numbers than 
VDMA for the same year. These lower numbers are the benchmark from which Gehrig 
(1961) backward-extrapolated the official machinery index to 1925 (but not to 1913). 
This procedure tended to underestimate the growth in machinery output between the 
VDMA benchmark for 1913 and the revised, lower benchmark for 1928. In an attempt to 
correct the 1913 benchmark, Ritschl (2004) employed companion information from 
VDMA (1926) to arrive at higher output growth between 1913 and 1928.  
 Archival research on the VDMA data by Fremdling (2005) provides a new bench-
mark for gross output of machinery in 1913, along with a consistent series back to 1909. 
Fremdling’s 1913 benchmark is 2609.6 mill M in 1913 as opposed to VDMA’s 2800 
                                                 
8 Wagenführ headed a group on industrial statistics at Berlin’s Institut für Konjunkturforschung. 
An updated index is included in Wagemann (1935). Tooze (2001) provides a history of this in-
stitution, which carried out business cycle research and conducted monthly industry surveys at 
a wide coverage, beginning in 1928. 
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2800 mill. M9. The percentage discrepancy between both benchmarks is exactly equal to 
the discrepancy between VDMA’s own sales data for 1928 and the official census.10 This 
suggests that the census was conducted for exactly the same reporting group of machine 
producers for which Fremdling (2005) worked out the 1913 benchmark. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
As Table 3 shows, growth in nominal sales, column (ii), between Fremdling’s 
(2005) 1913 benchmark and the 1928 census benchmark is the same as between the un-
corrected VDMA data of column (i). Hence, the VDMA figures overstate levels in both 
1913 and 1928 but describe growth between the benchmarks correctly. Deflating by ma-
chinery prices, real output of machinery declines slightly between 1913 and 1928, (in 
column (vi)). The decline is very close to the data in Ritschl (2004), shown in column 
(vii). The series of Wagenführ (1933) exhibits a larger decline between 1913 and 1928 
but is identical between 1913 and the benchmark year of 1935 (column (viii)). Frem-
dling’s (2005) data on machinery sales and output thus fully confirm the existing revi-
sions of Hoffmann’s (1965) output in metal-working.  
 Table 3 also provides Fremdling’s sales data for 1909. Converting these into a 
real output index yields an estimate which is, again, close to the Wagenführ data for the 
                                                 
9 This latter estimate seems to be derived from the export shares of VDMA’s members in 1913, 
see Fremdling (2005). 
10 Sales according to the 1928 census were 3728 mill. RM. The VDMA figure for the same year 
is 4000 mill. RM. We obtain Fremdling’s corrected 1913 benchmark of 2609.6 mill. M by 
multiplying the published VDMA figure of 2800 mill. M for that year with the relationship be-
tween the 1928 figures: 2800*[3728/4000]=2609.6.  
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same year. Thus, the revisions also confirm Wagenführ’s (1933) index of machinery pro-
duction, except around 1928. 
 Burhop (2005) has suggested a number of possible revisions to Hoffmann’s index, 
some of which also refer to metal-working and machine building. This index revision 
forms the basis for some of the time series projections in Broadberry and Burhop (2005).  
Burhop employs the same published VDMA sources as above, except for the sales data. 
He constructs a 1913 benchmark for net value added and for per-capita output in machine 
building. His estimate of net value added in 1913 is 954 mill. M. Dividing this by the 
VDMA employment estimate of 460’000, he arrives at a net value added per capita of 
2074 M. This is clearly too low. On the basis of an employment of 420’000 to 450’000, 
Fremdling (2005), working from internal VDMA files, obtains average gross output of 
2525 or 2694 mill. M, which averages 2609.6 mill. M. This results in an average gross 
output per person in the range of 5900 M. Assuming the same proportions as in the 1928 
industry census for 1913, net value added was around 60% of gross output. This implies 
more than 3500 M of net value added per person in machine building, over a third more 
than Burhop’s estimate and almost twice the labor productivity estimate implicit in 
Hoffmann (1965). 
 The reason for this discrepancy is the likely underestimation of profits in Bur-
hop’s (2005) estimate, who takes corporate profits in machine building industry from 
published corporate balance sheets, which are notoriously unreliable given the leniency 
of German accounting laws, see Spoerer (1996), Baten and Schulz (2005). The underes-
timation of profits is, however, also a reflection of a similar underestimation in Hoffmann 
(1965). Hoffmann’s (1965) index of production in metal-processing industry builds on 
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employment, multiplied by average wage rates, assuming a profit share that is representa-
tive for industry as a whole and constant over time. This approach towards estimating 
output ignores the substantial shift in wage bargaining power towards labor that took 
place in Germany after 1918. Ritschl (1990) showed that all available estimates of Ger-
man national product except for Hoffmann’s aggregate output series imply a strong in-
crease in the wage share in national income between 1913 and 1925. This shift is also 
clearly visible if wage bills are calculated into the expenditure and income series of 
Hoffmann (1965), as well as the official national income series.  
That there is no such shift in Hoffmann’s aggregate output series is by construc-
tion, as Hoffmann’s index of metal processing is built on the assumption of constant 
wage shares. As discussed in Ritschl (2004), this has major consequences for the behav-
ior of Hoffmann’s industrial and aggregate output series. Removing Hoffmann’s index of 
metal processing and implanting a revised, more realistic index, both the index of indus-
trial production and aggregate output behave almost exactly like the other series. The 
profit squeeze in German industry between 1913 and 1925 is a classical theme in German 
historiography, and has generated a large literature, see Borchardt (1990). Hoffmann’s 
index merely assumes it away, as does Burhop’s revision and its application by Broad-
berry and Burhop (2005). As soon as Hoffmann’s tales on production in metal processing 
are replaced with actual data, the traditional picture reappears: profits in metal processing 
were much larger before the war than afterwards, and the output of machinery declined 
from 1913 to 1928 instead of increasing. Thus, reverting to the original Hoffmann data is 
no longer an option. There is solid evidence on output in the respective industries across 
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World War I, which tells a different story. Any time series projection of comparative 
productivity has to build on this evidence to be minimally credible. 
 
4. A further revision and a new time series projection of productivity 
 Further revisions to the data suggest themselves from a reassessment of Ger-
many’s 1936 industry census by Fremdling and Staeglin (2003). According to their re-
sults, the production of military aircraft, along with some minor armament industries, is 
missing from the industry aggregates of this census, and is instead included in the con-
struction sector. The industries in question employed about 168 thousand people in 1936 
and generated sales of about 956 mill. RM. For aircraft industry with 145 thousand peo-
ple at work, gross output was 883 mill. RM or 6067 RM per capita.11  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
As Table 4 bears out, aircraft and the smaller armament industries in 1936 were 
smaller than the auto industry in terms of productivity, but larger in terms of employ-
ment.12 Employment in armament industry was about 28.3% of employment in machine 
building in that year, with slightly lower productivity. To add aircraft and armament in-
dustry to the index of industrial production for 1936, machine building thus seems to be 
the proper choice. Also, it seems plausible to assume that in the mid-1930s, machinery 
                                                 
11 German Federal Archives, R3102/3028.  
12 This would suggest that in terms of employment creation, the Third Reich was probably less of 
a story about cars, roads, and the autobahn, as in Overy (1975), but rather about bomber air-
craft and runways.  
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and aircraft production grew roughly at the same rates. Then, the index 1913=100 for 
machine building for 1935 increases by 28.3 %, i.e. from 80.9 to 103.75 (see Table 4). 
This implicitly assumes that there was no aircraft production to speak of in 1913.13 
  The results from this upward revision of German machinery production for the 
benchmark year of 1935 can now be fed back into the productivity comparisons of Tables 
1 and 2. As productivity in aircraft and armament was close to that of machine building, 
and as machine building was close to the average benchmark, the productivity benchmark 
of Broadberry and Fremdling (1990) remains mostly unchanged. If anything, a slight 
downward revision is appropriate (Table 5).  
Whether Hoffmann’s (1965) employment estimate for 1935 needs to be adjusted 
as well is doubtful.  His estimates are based on the annually published statistics of social 
security membership by industry14. These data are likely to be unaffected by the window-
dressing in the published industry census, which came out only in 1939. Hoffmann’s es-
timate of employment in metal processing industry for 1935 is 2.67 million, to which a 
168 thousand employed in aircraft and armament industry in 1936, or less for 1935, may 
or may not have to be added. To be on the safe side we do adjust the employment in 
metal working industry. 
                                                 
13 Inspection of the net value added data from the 1936 census substantiates the revision. Value 
added in total industry (including construction, where the armament data were hidden, and 
utilities) at the census was 34.185 bn RM at 1936 prices, or 27.305 bn RM at 1913 prices (au-
thor’s own calculations from German Federal Archives, R3102. GNP deflator is calculated 
from Ritschl, 2002, Appendix B). Net value added for the same classification of industry in 
Hoffmann (1965, p. 455) is virtually identical at 27286 bn RM. Thus, the coverage of value 
added by the 1936 census and by Hoffmann (1965) is the same.  
14 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, various issues. The industry census of 1936 
covers about 82% of Hoffmann’s (1965, p. 199) employment (adding about 1.9 million self-
employed to the former). The discrepancy is largely due to Hoffmann’s (1965) use of a wider 
employment concept from the employment censuses of 1933 and 1933, which he interpolates 
by social insurance membership data. 
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(Table 5 about here) 
 
Table 5 combines the information of Tables 1 and 2 for the revised Hoffmann in-
dex, to which output in the aircraft and firearms industries has been added for 1935. As 
the table bears out, inclusion of these industries does not eliminate the Anglo-German 
productivity paradox entirely: for 1907, the backward projection from 1935 is still above 
the benchmark for the revision. However, about 50 per cent of the gap vis a vis the 
Broadberry/Fremdling (1990) benchmark is closed. For 1907, the time series estimate is 
now close to the 10 per cent error margin suggested by Broadberry (1993) for such com-
parisons. To be sure, if the somewhat higher 1935 benchmark of de Jong and Fremdling 
(2005) is taken as a yardstick, the discrepancy grows considerably. This is true for both 
the original Hoffmann series and the revision. As none of the available benchmarks for 
1907 employ double-deflation techniques, the de Jong and Fremdling benchmark and the 
1907 benchmarks are not directly comparable. Irrespective of the benchmark, however, 
the Anglo/German paradox is not as bad as Broadberry and Burhop (2005) think: once 
the proper corrections to the time series evidence are made, the benchmarks and the time 
series projections do not tell wholly irreconcilable stories. All the evidence examined 
here indicates that Germany enjoyed a growing productivity lead in manufacturing over 
Britain prior to World War I. Given the paucity of comparable data for 1907 and the in-
evitable pitfalls in the historical time series, it is hard to know whether the lead was 
closer to 10 per cent, as suggested by the benchmark, or to a more substantial 25 per cent, 
as suggested by the time series evidence. However, it seems safe to rule out extreme sce-
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narios such as Germany trailing Britain in manufacturing around 1907, or instead forging 
ahead at 60 to 70 per cent, as one of the calculations in Broadberry and Burhop (2005) 
suggested. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications for future research 
Time series projections and benchmark estimates of comparative productivity for 
Germany and Britain prior to the First World War do not always seem to coincide well. 
Only if for Germany a time series with dubious growth characteristics is chosen can the 
benchmarks and the time series projections be reconciled. This is the Anglo/German in-
dustrial productivity paradox, stated by Broadberry and Burhop (2005).    
The present paper has restated the paradox. It recalculated the productivity projec-
tion from a commonly accepted 1935 benchmark back to 1907, employing the conten-
tious series of Hoffmann (1965) for Germany along with an alternative index by Wagen-
führ (1933) and a correction of the Hoffmann series recently suggested by Ritschl (2004). 
While the discrepancies from the 1907 benchmarks are substantially lower than in 
Broadberry and Burhop (2005), the productivity paradox itself seemed robust: around 
1907, there is no deviation to speak of in the case of the original Hoffmann (1965) series, 
while time series projection using Wagenführ (1933) and Ritschl’s (2004) correction of 
Hoffmann resulted in large (and near-identical) upward discrepancies from the bench-
mark. 
The present paper has also suggested a possible resolution. In the light of recent 
research on the Anglo/American productivity paradox (see the debate between Ward and 
Devereux, 2003, 2004, and Broadberry, 2004), major discrepancies between a compara-
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tive benchmark and time series projections from a different benchmark would probably 
be expected as normal. However, recent archival discoveries by Fremdling, documented 
partly in Fremdling and Staeglin (2003), suggest further revisions of the German time 
series evidence around the 1935 benchmark. The reason for this is mismeasurement of 
German industrial output and productivity, caused by the omission of war-related indus-
tries from Germany’s industrial census in 1936. Correcting for the omission both at the 
benchmark and in the time series, we find that almost 50 per cent of the Anglo/German 
productivity paradox for 1907 disappear.  
This paper also presented evidence that further substantiates the revisions to 
Hoffmann’s index by Ritschl (2004) for 1913 and the 1920s. Fremdling (2005) has re-
cently reconstructed machinery output in Germany for key years before World War I 
from archival data. These data confirm existing estimates of machine output that entered 
into Ritschl’s calculations, and make the original Hoffmann series look even less plausi-
ble.  
The results of this paper, as well as the various corrections to Hoffmann’s index 
suggest the need for a full recalculation of a German industrial production index, combin-
ing the various existing revisions with the available archival data. They also highlight the 
risks inherent in time series projections of comparative productivity from imperfect index 
numbers. Yet, the results of this paper imply that the Anglo/German industrial productiv-
ity paradox is not as bad as it seems, provided the inconsistencies in the existing time se-
ries for Germany are ironed out properly. 
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 Table 1: Productivity in Manufacturing in Germany (D) relative to the UK (extrapolated backwards from Broadberry/Fremdling benchmark for 1935)
Germany relative to
Britain (1913=100, rebased to 1935) Germany (1913=100, rebased to 1935) Britain same year
Employment Output Productivity Employment Output Productivity Productivity (Britain=100)
Hoffmann Wagenfuehr
Hoffmann 
corrected Hoffmann Wagenfuehr
Hoffmann 
corrected Hoffmann Wagenfuehr
Hoffmann 
corrected
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii)
1881 77.0 37.0 48.0 54.9 23.1 26.53 42.0 48.3 89.3 102.7
1891 86.4 45.4 52.6 68.9 33.4 37.1 48.6 53.9 94.3 104.7
1895 56.8 71.5 40.5 39.8 45.9 56.7 55.7 64.2 101.8 99.9 115.3
1901 93.8 55.2 58.9 83.4 47.5 56.6 54.0 56.9 67.9 64.8 98.6 117.7 112.3
1907 61.0 93.4 64.4 73.6 73.0 69.0 78.8 78.1 115.4 131.7 130.7
1911 102.6 64.5 62.9 97.1 73.7 88.0 82.8 75.9 90.7 85.3 123.0 147.0 138.3
1925 97.5 85.6 87.8 110.1 85.3 88.0 89.4 77.4 80.0 81.2 89.9 92.8 94.3
1929 102.1 87.3 85.5 111.5 100.1 103.8 107.8 89.7 93.1 96.7 107.1 111.1 115.4
1935 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 102 102 102
Sources and Methods:
(i-iii) Manufacturing output calculated into employment, from Feinstein (1972). 1895 and 1907 values interpolated
(iv,v) Hoffmann (1965), for categories comparable to Feinstein (1972)
(vi) Wagenfuehr (1933), excluding mining, construction and utilities
(vii) Ritschl (2004)
(xi-xiii)1935 benchmark from Broadberry and Fremdling (1990). 
 Table 2: Output in German Metal-Processing Industry
Machines Electrical Motor vecs. Shipbuilding Total Hoffmann
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100
1925 69.0 117.1 329.4 62.1 84.4 131.4
1926 58.7 98.2 275.7 59.1 72.6 103.9
1927 76.9 126.9 467.0 64.1 94.0 142.6
1928 97.8 156.9 558.2 73.0 116.1 163.5
1929 99.8 166.6 559.4 74.5 119.9 170.3
1930 77.2 125.3 403.0 54.2 90.7 156.9
1931 57.5 99.6 319.0 25.5 66.6 120.3
1932 39.0 70.9 236.4 12.7 45.5 84.2
1933 45.5 75.0 408.9 11.3 52.8 91.6
1934 60.7 103.4 603.7 26.7 74.6 125.5
1935 80.1 123.1 815.5 61.5 100.5 163.9
1936 97.4 136.2 975.0 79.3 119.4 202.6
1937 122.2 150.0 1152.0 89.4 141.4 239.7
1938 146.1 192.0 1408.0 88.2 169.2 281.1
Sources: Ritschl (2004), Hoffmann (1965)
 Table 3: Recalculating Output in Machine Building
Nominal Sales Prices Real Output  (1913 = 100)
VDMA
Fremdling
(2005) Census
VDMA, 
Fremdling,
Census
Ritschl
(2004)
Wagenfuehr
(1933) / IfK
mill. M/RM Index mill. M mill. M/RM Index
(i) (ii) (iii) (v) (vi) (vii) (ix)
1909 1738.2 106.2 62.7 63.9
1913 2800 100 2609.6 2609.6 100 100 100 100 100
1928 4000 142.9 3728 142.9 144.8 98.7 97.8 94.1
1935 2697 103.3 127.8 80.9 80.1 80.2
Sources:  Calculated from Ritschl (2004), Fremdling (2005)
 Table 4: German Aircraft and Armament Industry in 1936
Employment Sales (RM) Output per capita Unadjusted Corrected
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Aircraft 145,543 883,000,000 6066.9
Handguns 22,308 73,903,395 3312.9
Total not in census 167,851 956,903,395 5700.9
Shipbuilding 79,887 499,810,437 6256.5 61.5
Motor vehicles 167,620 1,832,663,702 10933.4 815.5
Machine Building 593,093 3,770,055,495 6356.6 80.9
Machines & Armament 760,944 4,726,958,890 6212.0 103.75
Source: (i-iii): German Federal Archives, R 3102/3028, R3102/3540-44
(iv): Table 2, Table 3
(v): = (iv), weighed by employment shares
Output 1935 (1913=100)
Germany relative to Productivity 
Germany Britain same year benchmarks
Employment Output Productivity Productivity (Britain=100)
Hoffmann
Hoffmann 
revised Hoffmann
Hoffmann 
revised Hoffmann
Hoffmann 
revised I II III IV
(i) (ii) (iv) (v) (vii) (viii) (x)
1881 55.9 23.1 25.7 41.2 46.0 87.1 97.2
1891 70.2 33.4 36.0 47.7 51.3 92.0 99.0
1895 72.8 40.5 44.5 55.7 61.1 99.4 109.1
1901 84.9 47.5 52.4 55.9 61.6 96.3 106.2
1907 95.2 64.4 70.7 67.7 74.3 112.6 123.6 95 110
1911 98.9 73.7 80.2 74.5 81.1 120.1 130.8
1925 112.2 84.7 86.7 75.5 77.3 87.2 89.2
1929 113.6 100.1 104.5 88.1 92.0 104.5 109.2
1935 100 100 100 100 100 101.45 101.45 102 109
Sources and Methods: Productivity benchmarks:
(i,ii) Hoffmann (1965), for categories comparable to Feinstein (1972) I Broadberry and Fremdling (1990)
(iii) Wagenfuehr (1933), excluding mining, utilities, and construction II Fremdling (1991)
(iv) Ritschl (2004) III de Jong and Fremdling (2005)
(v-x)  from (v-vii), calculated into the employment estimate in (iv). IV Broadberry and Burhop (2005)
1935 benchmark from Broadberry and Fremdling (1990), adjusted for productivity in aircraft industry. 
Table 5: Accounting for the Heinkel Bomber: Revised Relative Productivity Projections for German 
Manufacturing (extrapolated backwards from Broadberry/Fremdling benchmark for 1935)
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